The successive crises in southern Yemen between the legitimate government and the STC have weakened the relationship within the Saudi-UAE alliance since the Saudi-backed Yemeni government accuses the UAE of supporting and financing the STC, especially after the latter de autonomousclared administration in southern Yemen in April. That is why it is essential for Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates to accelerate the implementation of the Riyadh agreement. However, many observers do not believe that this agreement will bring a fundamental end to the conflict, but are working to suspend it and monitor its pace. Mr. Muwadea added: “The agreement reduces President Hadi`s powers, as any appointment decisions he makes would require Saudi Arabia`s approval.” Yemeni author and political researcher Abdel Nasser al-Mouwadea told Al-Monitor: “This agreement has established Saudi Arabia as a guardian state over the southern regions, according to which it will monitor and administer the forces present there, whether separatist forces or those of President [Abed Rabbo Mansour] Hadi. Saudi Arabia will also take care of the merger process and the training of counter-terrorism forces and will determine the missions of these forces and the areas of their deployment. RIYADH: Government and separatist forces continued to deploy their troops in southern Yemen on Sunday as part of a Saudi mediation agreement. Even within the STC, opinions differ as to the value of the agreement, and a prominent figure, Ahmed Okeil,1, argues that there is no confidence in an agreement whose benefactors have no influence on its implementation or not. This is an indication of other reactions from the South to the agreement, peppered with accusations that the “Muslim Brotherhood group of Qatar” in the Hadi government has not delayed its implementation. On Friday, Saudi Arabia`s ambassador to Yemen, Mohammed Al-Jaber, said the Riyadh agreement would “respect peace, security and stability” and that the Yemeni people would “reap the rewards” of the agreement. The agreement provides for various procedures for the commissioning of state institutions, the most important ones are the most important: the agreement and its full or partial implementation are likely to face various challenges: the agreement was signed following the opening of negotiations by Saudi Arabia on 11 August 2019 following the STC`s initiative to expel Hadi loyalists from Aden and other southern regions. This section describes the main points covered by the agreement.1 Meanwhile, several complications hinder the implementation of the Riyadh agreement, in addition to its rejection by some southern forces, in particular what was declared by the Higher Council of the Southern Movement, which rejected the agreement “as a whole” on 2 August, suggesting protests to defend the demand for separation and restoration of the South Yemeni state.
Opponents of the STC often reduce the group to a mere deputy from the United Arab Emirates, which continue to fund and support some of their political operations, but this does not allude to the public support that the STC has in its communities. The Hadi government and loyalists continue to ignore protests in the southern region in support of the STC and overplay those who support Hadi. Much of this propaganda undermines the prospects of a genuine implementation of an agreement. Moreover, the update of the STC does not bode well for Yemen, as it deepens political marginalization. In addition, the Hadi government cannot request the demilitarization of STC-allied forces because it is unable to protect the South from Houthi military incursions.